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LETTER DATED 27 MAY 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to forward, enclosed herewith, the aide-mémoire on attacks by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against diplomatic and consular missions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-15883 (E) 280599

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Annex

Aide-mémoire on attacks by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against diplomatic and consular missions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia issued at Belgrade on 26 May 1999

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia draws attention hereby to attacks by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against diplomatic and consular missions, as well as against diplomatic and consular officers on its territory, as a special form of aggression.

I

In NATO aggressors' actions so far against civilian targets in Belgrade residential quarters, the Embassy of the People's Republic of China was a direct target of NATO bombing, while another 19 diplomatic missions, embassies or Ambassadors' residences suffered either a larger or smaller degree of destruction due to bombing of civilian targets in the vicinity of these buildings.

1. On the night of 7-8 May 1999, NATO aircraft launched several missiles against the Chinese Embassy building and residence at 3 Trešnjin cvet Street. Three Chinese journalists who happened to be in the building at that time were killed on the spot, and another eight members of the staff sustained serious or light injuries, of whom the condition of the Defence Attaché was the most serious.

2. The Embassy building and residence, which are owned by the State of the People's Republic of China, were damaged to such an extent by missiles that they have been rendered inoperative, and the staff were forced to relocate to another venue.

The Yugoslav Government has taken appropriate measures to assist the Embassy to enable it to resume its operations and has also taken appropriate diplomatic steps concerning this crime by NATO aircraft, unprecedented in international practice thus far.

As regards the bombing of its Embassy, the People's Republic of China has undertaken a number of well-known measures, ranging from informing the international public to addressing the Security Council and the Government of the United States of America with a request to carry out an investigation and punish those responsible for the attack against the Embassy, which is, on the basis of its extraterritoriality, treated as part of the territory of the People's Republic of China.

2. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, during the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital, the Embassy of Angola, situated at 35 Tolstojeva Street, was damaged as a result of explosions (the windows were broken and window and door frames of the building and the garage were damaged).

3. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the Danish Embassy, at 9a Neznanog junaka Street, suffered damage in the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital (windows were broken).

4. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the residence of the Egyptian Ambassador, at 25 Tolstojeva Street, was damaged, also as the result of the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital (windows were broken).

5. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the explosions following the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital caused damage to the residence of the Indian residence, at 19 Andra Nikolić Street (windows were broken and window and door frames damaged).

6. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the Iraqi Embassy, at 38 Teodor Drajzer Street, suffered damage in the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital (windows in the basement and on the first floor were broken, and the adjoining building sustained exterior and interior damage).

7. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the residence of the Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, at 48a Uzička Street, was damaged in the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital.

8. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the explosions following the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital inflicted damage to the residence of the Israeli Ambassador, at 47 Bulevar mira Street.

9. During the bombing of the building housing the headquarters of the Yugoslav Army on the night of 29-30 April and again on the night of 7-8 May 1999, the Italian Embassy, at 11 Birčaninova Street, as well as the Ambassador's residence, at 9 Birčaninova Street, sustained damage.

10. During the bombing of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Republican Ministry of the Interior buildings, the explosions caused damage to the windows on the Canadian Embassy building, at 76 Kneza Miloša Street.

11. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the explosions following the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital caused damage to the residence of the Ambassador of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, at 54 Tolstojeva Street (the windows in the basement and on the first floor were broken and window frames as well as the entrance door suffered damage).

12. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the explosions following the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital caused damage to the residence of the Hungarian Ambassador, at 25a Bulevar mira Street.

13. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital resulted in damage to the Norwegian Ambassador's residence, at 19 Tolstojeva Street.

14. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the explosions following the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital damaged the Pakistani Embassy building, at 62 Bulevar mira Street (all glass on the doors and windows was broken).

15. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital caused damage to the Polish Ambassador's residence, at 58 Bulevar mira Street (the glass on the windows and doors was broken and some of the doors were pulled out of their frames).

16. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the bombing of the Jugopetrol depot on Radnička Street and the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital inflicted damage to the residence of the Ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic, at 3 Milovana Glišića Street (the windows were broken and all three chandeliers in two rooms were broken to pieces).

17. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the explosions following the bombing of the Jugopetrol depot on Radnička Street caused damage to the Spanish Ambassador's residence, at 26 Augusta Cesarca Street.

18. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the bombing of the Jugopetrol depot on Radnička Street caused damage to the Swiss Ambassador's residence, at 30 Andre Nikolića Street (windows were broken and the door to the main building was damaged).

19. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the explosions following the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital caused damage to the Swedish Ambassador's residence, at 45 Uzička Street (the glass on the windows and doors was broken and a French window was pulled out by the blast).

20. On the night of 19-20 May 1999, the bombing of the Dragiša Mišović Hospital caused damage to the Zimbabwean Embassy building, at 51 Tolstojeva Street (the glass on the windows and doors was broken and two doors and their frames were pulled out).

II

The attacks of NATO aggressors against diplomatic and consular missions in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represent a violation of the norms of international law concerning the obligation not to use force against another State, not to violate the sovereignty of another State and, in particular, the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, which was adopted by the General Assembly on 14 December 1973 and which entered into force on 20 February 1977. Yugoslavia has been a party to this Convention since 17 December 1974, and among the NATO member States that are taking part in the aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the parties to the Convention are the United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Germany, Canada, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands.

Crimes against diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons constitute a serious threat to the maintenance of normal international relations, and in this specific case they represent a special form of threat to international peace and security. The purpose of bombing diplomatic and consular missions and Ambassadors' residences is to exercise pressure on

diplomatic representatives who have remained in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to leave the country.

Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, incriminates such acts as murder, kidnapping or other attacks on internationally protected persons, violent attacks against official premises or private residences or vehicles of internationally protected persons which might put their person or liberty at risk.

Under the Convention, a suspect is a person against whom there is sufficient prima facie evidence that he has committed or taken part in the commission of one or more crimes against internationally protected persons.

The States parties to the Convention are bound to take necessary measures to punish the perpetrators of crimes against internationally protected persons, including in cases where the perpetrator is a national of the same State (article 3 of the Convention).

Under article 7 of the Convention, a State party on the territory of which a suspect finds himself is bound to prosecute him in accordance with its national laws without exception and delay. All States parties are obliged to provide in their criminal legislation for an appropriate punishment of the perpetrators of crimes against internationally protected persons, taking into account the severity of the crimes committed.

The competent authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are doing all they can to ensure the conditions for the normal work of diplomatic and consular missions and their representatives, in accordance with its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. In this respect, it will assist them to create appropriate conditions for the rapid repair and elimination of the damaged caused.

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I have the honour to forward, enclosed herewith, the Memorandum on the Humanitarian Consequences of the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIĆ
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex

Memorandum on the humanitarian consequences of the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The Nato aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represents the most flagrant breach of the Charter of the United Nations, a gross violation of the Helsinki Final Act and the undermining of the very foundations of the international law and order which are primarily aimed against civilian population and structures. At the same time, this aggression which has a clear genocidal character is a crime against peace and humanity. It represents an unprecedented breach of all international conventions and covenants on human rights, as well as the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts.

Over two months of NATO aerial bombardement of the FR of Yugoslavia has been endangering all basic human rights and fundamental freedoms of the entire Yugoslav population ranging from the denial of right to life to the right of information and freedom of movement. Daily destruction of bridges, railways, industrial facilities, especially chemical and pharmaceutical plants, as well as power stations has caused devastating consequences on all walks of life. The NATO aggression has also provoked enormous ecological catastrophe affecting ozone layer, polluting air, water and soil with toxic materials released from the destroyed chemical plants, and endangering wildlife in the national parks which have been regularly targeted by NATO bombers.

The best proof of the contempt of NATO militarists for a political settlement of problems is their brutal bombing the FR of Yugoslavia immediately after the ministerial meeting of G-8 in Bonn on 7 May 1999, when the Embassy of the People' s Republic of China in Belgrade was destroyed. The aggressor has repeated similar bombing the same day on which the Yugoslav Army Supreme Headquarters announced the decision on a partial withdrawal of its units from Kosovo and Metohija when more than thirty towns and cities and industrial areas were struck.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has warned on time the United Nations Security Council of a possible aggression, and when the aggression started it demanded its immediate cessation and strong condemnation. Heeding this legitimate request of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would have prevented enormous human sufferings and material destruction. The most illustrative examples are given below.

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KILLING AND PLIGHT OF THE CIVILIANS

For almost two months now NATO aggressors systematically attack civilian targets in the entire territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, directly threatening the lives and fundamental human rights of the entire Yugoslav population. By 21 May 1999, during 59 days of relentless bombing, the NATO aggressor has flown 27 000 sorties by over a thousand warplanes attacking 1 800 various targets. By the same date most of the attacks were made on Pristina, Belgrade, Prizren, Djakovica, Kraljevo, Novi Sad, Nis, Valjevo, Cacak. Furthermore, over three thousand cruise missiles have been dropped on the civilian targets thus far. Since the onset of the aggression against the FR of Yugoslavia, over ten thousand tons of explosive was dropped with the destructive effect ten times over the nuclear bomb used in the attack on Hiroshima.

The NATO aggressor has killed so far more than 1 700 civilians, while over 10 thousand people sustained injuries, many of whom will remain crippled for life. At the same time, several thousand private homes and flats have been ruined, mostly in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Pancevo, Nis, Cuprija, Aleksinac, Kragujevac Pristina, Prizren, Valjevo, Surdulica, Kraljevo, Kursumlija, etc.

(a) Killings of Civilians Caused by the Bombings of Urban and Rural Residential Areas

Towns in Kosovo and Metohija: More than eight hundred civilians were killed in the bombing of Pristina, Korisa, Djakovica, Prizren, Kosovo Polje, Urosevac, Kosovska Mitrovica, Suva Reka, Istok, refugee centres in Orahovac, Djakovica, Srbica, Prizren, Vitina, etc.

Belgrade: Several dozen civilians were killed and more than one hundred wounded in the bombing of various parts of the city, including its very centre: the building of Radio and Television of Serbia (16 killed and 19 wounded professional journalists and technical staff - see Chapter V-a), Embassy of the People' s Republic of China (4 employees killed and more than 50 wounded - Chapter IV), the hospital "Dragisa Misovic" (at least 3 patients were killed and several dozen wounded), the buildings of the federal and republican ministries

(Chapter II-b), business centre "Usce", heating plant in Novi Beograd, hotel "Jugoslavija".

Surdulica: Twenty civilians were killed (including 12 children) and over 100 wounded (including 24 seriously) during the bombing on 27 April 1999.

Nis: Fifteen citizens were killed and more than 60 wounded in the bombing of the centre of the town by cluster bombs on 7 May 1999.

Kursumlija: Thirteen civilians were killed and twenty-five wounded in an attack on this town on 27 April 1999.

Aleksinac: Twelve civilians were killed and forty wounded in the bombing of 5 April 1999.

Murino near Plav: Five civilians were killed and eight children wounded in the bombing of this village on 3 May 1999.

Istok: Hundred inmates and security guards were killed and more than two hundred wounded in the bombing of the prison on 21 May 1999.

There were many civilian casualties during the air strikes against Pancevo, Cacak, Vranje, Nis, Valjevo and many other cities and towns.

(b) Killing of Children

Children are the most vulnerable category of population most affected by war atrocities. So far several dozen hospitals were destroyed or damaged, including inter alias, the greatest maternity hospitals in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nis, Kragujevac and maternity wards in other medical centres in Serbia. NATO aggressors destroyed more than 300 pre-school institutions, elementary and secondary schools and university institutions, depriving children from education. Children are forced to spend sleepless nights in shelters and deprived of elementary, health and social care. They are exposed to stresses which will permanently affect their development, by which the Convention on the rights of the child is grossly violated.

Many children were killed or wounded in the bombing of civilian structures and residential areas which can be illustrated by following examples:

Dozens of children were the victims of the latest attack of NATO aircraft on Albanian refugees returning to their homes in the village of Korisa when at least 87 people lost their lives.

The killing of several dozen of children during the bombing of the train in Grdelica gorge on 12 April, the buss in Luzani on 1 May and buss on the Pec-Rozaje road on 3 May 1999 (See Chapter I-c).

The killing of nineteen children in the refugee column near Djakovica on 14 April 1999 (Chapter I-d).

The killing of twelve children during the bombing of Surdulica on 27 April 1999.

The killing of nine children in the bombing of Kursumlija.

The killing of seven children in Srbica from cluster bombs.

The killing of six children in the bombing of a refugee centre in Djakovica.

The killing of five children from the Koxa family in the village of Doganovici near Urosevac when six children were wounded by cluster bombs.

Three children and two adults killed by a cluster bomb in the village of Velika Jablanica near Pec on 2 May 1999.

Two children killed in Aleksinac .

The killing of a three-year old girl in the Belgrade suburb of Batajnica, and many other cases.

Children are most often victims of the sprinkle cluster bombs with delayed effect. The death toll on children would have been even more tragic, had the missile exploded some thirty metres from the biggest Maternity Hospital in Belgrade.

(c) Killing of Passengers in Vehicles of Public Transportation

Under the cynical explanation that they are hitting "moving military targets", NATO aggressors have destroyed thus far several buses and killed a great number of passengers on board. By using the most sophisticated weapons of immense destructive power against civilian population of the FR of Yugoslavia, NATO pilots have been writing down the darkest pages in the history of crimes against humanity. Listed below are some of the most loathsome crimes which they have committed.

Fifty-five passengers were killed and twenty-six wounded in the Grdelica gorge during the attack on the international passenger train on the Belgrade-Thessaloniki line on 12 April 1999.

Sixty passengers lost their lives and four were wounded during the bombing of the "Nis ekspres" coach near the village of Luzani. On that occasion NATO warplanes bombed also the ambulance which came to help the victims when one doctor was injured on 1 May 1999.

Twenty people were killed and twenty were injured during the attack on the coach on the Pec-Rozaje line on 3 May 1999.

(d) Killing and Plight of Refugees

Particularly tragic is the fate of ethnic Albanian refugees, who convinced that they should not believe the propaganda ploys on the alleged "ethnic cleansing" decided to return to their homes in Kosovo and Metohija. Legal authorities of the FR of Yugoslavia encourage them every day to do so and guarantee their safety.

On 14 April 1999, 75 citizens of the FR of Yugoslavia were killed and over 40 of them sustained serious injuries in the bombing of a ÿarge group of refugees on the Djakovïca-Prizren road. The attack of NATO aircraft was systematically prepared and lasted for three hours. In this way, NATO has in the most brutal way "demonstrated" that innocent civilians are constantly abused for NATO interests.

The NATO's bombing of ethnic Albanian refugees in the village of Korisa in early morning hours on 14 May 1999, when 87 civilians, mostly women and children were killed and 67 sustained serious injuries, was a deliberate massacre designed to prevent the return of ethnic Albanian refugees. In this brutal attack NATO used at least 8 highly destructive and incendiary termovisual bombs which develop temperature up to 2000 Centigrade .

Over one hundred refugees were killed during the NATO bombing of refugee camps in which Serbs expelled from Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina were accommodated (Djakovica, Pristina, Kursumlija, etc). The victims were mostly the elderly, the frail and children. Thus, their tragic exodus which was brought about in the wake of the break-up of Yugoslavia was ruthlessly ended.

The continuous indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets in the FR of Yugoslavia affects in various ways the entire population. In some of the hardest hit areas in Kosovo and Metohija, the facilities of social infrastructure and supply lines were destroyed. By its uninterrupted bombings the aggressor makes it impossible for those in need to get help and in many cases it has even targeted the ambulances and their emergency medical teams. Therefore, a number of citizens are forced to find shelter in a safer place. Such development recorded in all areas in the world affected by warfare, NATO propaganda has systematically blown out of proportion by a claim of alleged "humanitarian catastrophe" trying thereby to make its aggression legitimate.

- II-

SUFFERING AND INTIMIDATION OF CIVILIAN POPULATION

(a) The Use of Graphite Bombs and Destruction of Electric Power System of the FR of Yugoslavia

The use of graphite bombs, which have caused short circuits on long-distance power transmission lines and collapse of the electric power system of Serbia is an incomprehensible example of inflicting mass suffering on population. More than five million citizens of Serbia were affected by blackout following the first attack by this highly inhuman weapon on 2 May 1999 at 9.50 p.m. and thus they could not meet their elementary needs (health, hygiene, etc). The most severely affected

are hospitals (particularly maternity hospitals - incubators, etc), including all patients (especially emergency cases and those in intensive care units and on life support apparatus). The power failure affected also the residents in cities who live in the high-rises, water supply systems, bakeries, frozen food stocks, etc .

The graphite bombs were also used on 7 May 1999 in the evening hours. Immediately after the power failure in entire Belgrade started the most fierce bombing raid against Belgrade (bombing of the Chinese Embassy, hotel "Jugoslavija", repeated bombing of the Ministry of Defence, the headquarters of the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, the Government of the Republic of Serbia, the buildings of the federal and republican ministries of the interior, etc.). The aggressor continued to use this inhuman weapon in line with its threat that "the switch for electricity is in its hand" and that it can cause suffering of the population whenever it likes to do so.

On 22 May 1999, along with graphite bombs NATO attacked with highly powerful missiles Kolubara thermo power plant in Vreoce causing again a blackout in the large part of Serbia. On 23 May 1999 NATO struck power plants in Obrenovac, Kostolac, Bajina Basta and Djerdap. These attacks clearly indicate that NATO`s intention is not only to cause a temporary interruption of electrical power supply system but rather to deprive the entire population of the FR of Yugoslavia of electricity causing thereby a nation wide humanitarian catastrophe. The use of this type of bombs as well as the use of the prohibited weapons such as cluster bombs, land mines and uranium depleted ammunition is in contradiction with the Convention on inhuman weapons of 10 October 1980.

(b) Bombing of the Government Buildings and Institutions

The bombings and destruction of objects and institutions, which symbolize the State and national identity, are aimed at harassing, intimidating and terrorizing the population and injuring their national pride. Thus, the buildings of the federal and

republican ministries of the interior (3 April 1999), of the Executive Council of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija and the Provincial Pension and Disability Insurance Fund (7 April 1999), the headquarters of the Executive Council of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (19 April 1999), the Ministry of Defense and General Staff of the Yugoslav Army (30 April and 7 May 1999), the Government of the Republic of Serbia (7 May 1999) were deliberately wantonly. The buildings of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the surrounding buildings, of great historical value were also severely damaged.

The repeated bombing on 7 May of already destroyed buildings of the Ministry of Defence and General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia, federal and republican ministries of the interior with ever greater consequences to the surrounding buildings including the building of the Federal Foreign Ministry which cannot be used for a longer period of time for normal activities represents an example of extreme brutality of NATO aggressors.

- III –

ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON PRESIDENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC

The bombing of the residence of the President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 22 April 1999 represents an organised terrorist act without precedent in the history of modern Europe. This is not only a crime against a Head of a sovereign State, but primarily an attack on the democratically expressed will of a people and thus against the fundamental democratic values of the civilisation. This NATO attack represents a flagrant violation of the Convention on the protection and punishment of the crime committed against persons under international protection including diplomatic agents from 1973. This crime has caused abhorrence and condemnation by international public, but the United Nations Security Council failed to condemn this terrorist act as well as numerous killings of civilians and children.

IV

BOMBING OF THE EMBASSY OF THE PR OF CHINA AND THE CONSULATE OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC AND THE RESIDENCE OF THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR

In the most fierce bombing of Belgrade so far, in the night between 7 and 8 May 1999, NATO aircraft hit with three missiles the building of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China in New Belgrade. Four employees were killed and more than 50 were wounded including a dozen who sustained severe injuries. This unseen crime fits into NATO strategy to undermine and discourage all on-going efforts of a constructive part of the international community, to which PR of China undoubtedly belongs, to stop the aggression against the FR of Yugoslavia and to have the problems in Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija resolved by political means.

The Consulate of the Hellenic Republic in Nis was hit on 8 May 1999 during the bombing of the bridge on the Nisava river. The building of the Consulate as well as several official vehicles were badly damaged.

In the attack on the nearby Belgrade hospital on 20 and 21 May 1999, the residences of the Swedish, Libyan, Swedes, Iraqui, Pakistani, Italian, Hungarian, Norwegian and Indian ambassadors were also damaged. Although the ambassadors were in the buildings at the time nobody was injured.

The bombing of embassies and consulates in the FRY, as well as the headquarters of the Yugoslav diplomacy on two occasions represents a barbaric attack by NATO aggressors on diplomacy and violation of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations.

- V -

CRIME AGAINST THE FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA

The aim of the destruction of a great number of private radio and television stations and more than two dozen TV transmitters and relay stations was to suppress the right to a different opinion and to further expand war-mongering manipulation with the world public. Clearly, the intention of NATO aggressors is to prevent the world public from learning the extensive scope of their crimes, as well as to impose on the world their totalitarian and single-minded perception. The censorship imposed by NATO generals on Western media is an illustrative example of this practice.

(a) Bombing of Radio and Television of Serbia in Belgrade

On 23 April 1999, NATO aggressors demolished the building of the Radio and Television of Serbia in Belgrade, the largest radio and TV company in the Balkans. On that occasion 16 employees of the Radio and Television of Serbia lost their lives while 19 sustained severe injuries.

(b) Bombing of Radio and Television of Serbia in Novi Sad

On 3 May 1999, NATO destroyed the building of the Radio and Television of Serbia in Novi Sad, the second largest TV centre in the FR of Yugoslavia, which broadcast programmes in the languages of all national minorities living in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. Each day 56 hour programme was broadcast in the Hungarian, Slovakian, Ruthenian, Romanian and Romany languages which is in the line with the commitment of the FR of Yugoslavia to guarantee equal rights to information to all its citizens.

(c) Bombing of the Business Centre "Usce" in Belgrade

By the bombings of the business centre "Usce" in Belgrade on 21 and 27 April 1999, the headquarters, as well as production and broadcasting infrastructure of the three private TV stations and four private radio stations were destroyed.

(d) Bombings of TV Transmitters and Relays

Several dozen TV transmitters and relay stations used by State-run or private TV and radio stations were destroyed during the NATO air strikes. The TV transmitter on Mt Avala, the biggest transmitter in the FR of Yugoslavia, which according to its architectural design was unique in the world, was raised to the ground. NATO destroyed also the TV transmitters on the business centre "Usce", on Fruska Gora, Goles (Pristina) and others, as well as relay stations in Krnjaca, Borca, on Bukulja, Cer, Crni vrh, Jasterbac, Ovcar, Tornik, etc.

Making good on its threat to "destroy the nerve centres of Serbia", the aggressor warplanes destroyed satellite station "Jugoslavija" near Ivanjica which transmitted PTT and TV signals world-wide. Also destroyed were telephone exchanges in Pristina (7 April 1999), Kragujevac and Uzice (7 May 1999), while many others were damaged or made inoperational in other towns of Serbia.

For all champions of the freedom of speech and for all people committed to the right to freedom of expression, these destructive acts represent the last warning alarm before NATO censorship take control over all media of the so-called "free world".

- VI -

DESTRUCTION OF VITAL YUGOSLAV ECONOMIC FACILITIES

According to the assessment of experts from Western countries, the damage done to date by NATO air strikes is well in excess of one hundred billion US dollars. By the destruction of factories, business capacities and production facilities, more than half a million people have lost their jobs and over two million of them remained without any kind of income . Destroyed are the industrial complexes in Belgrade, Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Nis, Pancevo, Cacak, Kraljevo, Valjevo, Pristina, Vranje, Kursumlija, Kosovska Mitrovica, Krusevac, Kula, Gnjilane, Sremska Mitrovica and in other towns and cities.

The petrochemical industry of the FR of Yugoslavia has been totally destroyed, as well as the largest Yugoslav factory of artificial fertilisers in Pancevo.

Private entrepreneurs are a particular target of NATO aggression and the most glaring example of it is the destruction of the "Usce" business centre in Novi Beograd which housed more than a hundred private firms in full business expansion, foreign representative offices, seven private Radio and TV stations and one of the most modern private poli-clinic in the FR of Yugoslavia. Also the building of the business center is one of the landmarks of modern Belgrade. This is a serious violation of the Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights as well as the UN Declaration on the right to development.

- VII –

DESTRUCTION OF BRIDGES

On the false pretext of "neutralising the military power of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia", the NATO aggressor started systematic destruction of Yugoslav road and rail traffic routes. So far, over fifty bridges have been demolished, damaged or made inoperational for traffic. Also, several dozen major and local roads, airports, railway tracks, railway stations, etc. have been destroyed. All ruined facilities were part of costly capital investments, into which the resources and the efforts of several generations of Yugoslav citizens were pooled and they all are strategic part of the European traffic infrastructure. It should be noted that some bridges were destroyed although they were still in the process of construction (a big bridge on the Sava river near Ostruznica), while some of them are of historical and cultural importance ("The Wailing Bridge" in Novi Sad, on which the Fascists killed several thousand Jews in the Second World War). The city of Novi Sad located on the banks of the Danube river remained without its bridges which were its landmarks and made it a unique architectural whole.

About 50 bridges, overpasses and other highway facilities have been destroyed at the strategic European E-75 corridor. Also, dozens of bridges along the Ibar highway and the roads leading to Montenegro (European corridors E-60, 70 and 80) were either destroyed or made unusable for traffic, thus closing traffic on these transport routes.

Destroyed were several bridges on the Belgrade-Bar, Belgrade-Thessaloniki, Belgrade-Bukarest and Belgrade-Budapest railway lines, so that any further international rail transport on these lines has been blocked.

By the destruction of the bridges on the Danube river the aggressors have blocked the entire river navigation at this traffic artery of the greatest importance for European economy and the shortest link between the Northern and Mediterranean Seas (The Rhein-Mein-Danube waterway). Thus, the European shipping companies suffer a damage of over 20 million DM each day.

It is not possible to list all destroyed bridges, but let us mention the most important ones: Sloboda Bridge, Wailing Bridge, Zezelj Bridge and the bridge in Beska (all in the city of Novi Sad), the bridges on the Danube river near Smederevo and Backa Palanka, etc.

- VIII –

ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER

Concurrently with the humanitarian, NATO strikes have caused an environmental catastrophe, which is endangering not only the FR of Yugoslavia, but also the neighbouring countries and the entire European continent. The NATO aggressor is thus teetering on the brink of another Chernobyl in the heart of Europe. The destruction of petrochemical installations, the warehouses storing semi-processed and finished products of the chemical industry have already caused significant adverse effects on the health of the population of the FR of Yugoslavia and the neighbouring countries. During some of the air strikes it was pure luck that an environmental catastrophe was not provoked spreading all over Europe.

The ozone layer was depleted by the exhaust gases and by large-scale fires. The Black Sea, Aegean and the Adriatic basins, practically the entire Mediterranean, are threatened by environmental pollution.

Examples: Nitrogen factory in Pancevo, chemical company "Prva iskra" in Baric, the oil refineries in Pancevo and Novi Sad, warehouses and tanks of oil deviates in Smederevo, Bogutovac near Kraljevo, Pristina, Nis, Uzicka Pozega, Sombor, Bor, Pozega, Negotin, Novi Sad, Lucani, etc.

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In this way NATO aggressors violated all conventions on the protection of the environment, protection of the ozone layer, climate, health.

The aggressors attacks destroyed large forest complexes not sparing even tourist resorts or national parks on the mountains on Serbia (Kopaonik, Zlatibor, Divcibare, Tara, Prokletije, Sara, Fruska Gora).

- IX –

HOSPITALS AND HEALTH INSTITUTIONS

The aggressor's bombings, calculated to provoke the greatest possible confusion and panic among innocent people, have damaged many clinical and hospital centres, inflicting not only great material damage to property (destruction of buildings and expensive medical equipment), but also causing new health problems and intensifying psychological traumas among the sick people.

The destruction of all the three bridges in Novi Sad totally cut off and left, without the supply of water, the largest Yugoslav centre for the treatment of cardio vascular diseases in Sremska Kamenica, to which several million people gravitate.

In the night on 20 May 1999 directly hit was the Clinical centre "Dragisa Misovic" in Belgrade when Neurology and Maternity hospitals were severely damaged so that 3 patients lost their lives while several dozen sustained injuries among whom two pregnant women and eleven children. In the NATO attacks during the last days, four hospitals and two maternity hospitals in Belgrade were also damaged including the biggest hospital in the Balkans (Military Medical Academy Hospital – VMA), the hospitals in Cuprija, Aleksinac, Nis, Pristina, Valjevo and Pancevo, sanatorium in Surdulica, as well as medical centres in many other towns. The striking example is also the destruction of the Secondary Medical School in Cuprija.

- X –

DESTRUCTION OF PRE-SCHOOL INSTITUTIONS, SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES

The NATO aggression has put a stop to the education of close to one million pupils and students in the FR of Yugoslavia. Over three hundred facilities built for the education and upbringing of children and young people of all ages were destroyed, whereby NATO has breached the Convention on the rights of the child and the Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights. This will inevitably be reflected on the development and social integration of young people. Hard hit are university centre in Nis (Machine Engineering, Civil Engineering, Electronic, Technical, Law and Economics faculties), in Pristina (Agricultural and Machine Engineering faculty) and Novi Sad (Faculty of Philosophy) and university centre in Belgrade.

- XI –

DESTRUCTION OF WORLD CULTURAL HERITAGE ON THE SOIL OF THE FR OF YUGOSLAVIA

The entire territory of the FR of Yugoslavia and Kosovo and Metohija in particular, is a treasury of European culture and civilisation since ancient times. By violating all international conventions on the protection of civilisation and its heritage the NATO aggressors have severely damaged thus far more than 50 monasteries and churches, as well as a couple of dozen of other cultural and historic monuments, some under UNESCO protection. Severe damage was caused to the monastery of the Patriachate of Pec (12th century), Zica (13th century), Decani and Gracanica (14th century, under UNESCO protection), medieval towns of Zvecan (13th century) and Smederevo (15th century), Petrovaradin fortress (18th century), seventeen monasteries on Fruska Gora (15-18th century), monastery in Rakovica and many other priceless historical monuments. The bombs have even destroyed many cemeteries all across the FR of Yugoslavia including Orthodox cemetery in Pristina.

- XII -

USE OF PROHIBITED WEAPONS

In NATO attacks, the state-of-the-art weapons have been used, but also those prohibited under international conventions (the so-called Convention on inhuman weapons of 10 October 1980), such as cluster bombs and slow activating bombs. In its attacks on civilian and other facilities in Serbia, NATO aircraft fired more than 100 containers with almost 20 000 cluster bombs. As many as one fourth of those cluster bombs were used in the attacks against towns in Kosovo and Metohija: Pristina, Urosevac, Djakovica, Prizren, etc, and against many other places and facilities in Serbia.

The latest severe case is the bombing of the centre of Nis by cluster bombs on 7 May 1999 in broad daylight when 15 civilians were killed and several dozen were wounded, as well as the bombing of residential quarters in Nis several days later.

In their numerous air strikes the enemy's warplanes used uranium depleted artillery ammunition. NATO committed thereby a very serious criminal act with unforeseeable consequences not only for the victims but also for all those who may be exposed to the released radiation therefrom (the "Gulf syndrome" of US soldiers who participated in the Operation Desert Storm).

* * *

At the moment it is difficult to perceive and evaluate the entire humanitarian, economic, environmental, health and other consequences of the NATO criminal aggression against the FR of Yugoslavia. The greatest victims of the aggression are all Yugoslav citizens irrespective of their nationality or religion, as well as their material and cultural resources. At the same time, by the violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the NATO has created a precedent, which may cast

a shadow over the future of all peoples and sovereign States. The cause for concern is all the greater because, by combining pressure and promises, NATO is drawing an increasing number of countries into its aggression against the FR of Yugoslavia, endangering thereby peace and security. Thus the energies are taken away from the goals of development causing enormous material losses. Attempt by NATO to justify its brutal aggression by an alleged care for the refugees may bring about an irreversible degradation of the United Nations and involve this highest international forum in the crime against a country which is one of its founding members.

Belgrade, 25 May 1999

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1999/621
28 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SIXTH REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By paragraph 3 of its resolution 1230 (1999) of 26 February 1999, the Security Council decided to review every 45 days, on the basis of reports of the Secretary-General, the mandate of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) in the light of the progress achieved towards implementation of commitments made by the President of the Central African Republic to the Secretary-General in his letter dated 23 January 1999 (S/1999/98, annex).

2. In accordance with paragraph 18 of resolution 1230 (1999), the first report was submitted to the Council on 14 April 1999 (S/1999/416). The present report describes developments in the Central African Republic since that time.

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

3. Despite the impasse over the distribution of posts in its Bureau described in my last report (S/1999/416, para. 3), the National Assembly has been functioning normally during the reporting period, and has taken action on a number of matters, including the modification of the electoral code, and the reform of the armed forces and of the economy. These are described in more detail below.

Establishment of the Mixed and Independent Electoral Commission

4. Much of the political activity since my last report has concerned the establishment, functioning and membership of the Mixed and Independent Electoral Commission, which is responsible for the organization and conduct of the elections. The inauguration of the Commission, which was eventually held on 19 May with the swearing-in of its members, had been seriously delayed as a result of a series of disagreements between the Mouvance présidentielle and the opposition, as well as internal splits. The Commission has 27 members, including 9 members each from the Mouvance présidentielle and the opposition, with other members representing government ministries and independents.

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5. In my last report (paras. 10-12), I described the objections expressed by the opposition arising from President Patassé's decision to entrust the administration of the Commission in the provinces to the sous-préfets, who are considered loyal to him. As a result of these objections, and following interventions by MINURCA and the donor community, the President issued a decree on 1 May establishing a control mechanism designed to ensure the impartial functioning of the Commission.

6. The Commission must now as a matter of urgency take a number of decisions on the organization and conduct of the elections, including the date of the polling, the electoral budget and the modalities of voting, none of which have yet been resolved. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which bears the main responsibility for the coordination of electoral assistance, is working with the Commission and MINURCA to produce a budget.

7. In its revision of the electoral code, the National Assembly has reportedly taken into account many of the proposals made by MINURCA and the donors as a result of their study of the legislative elections. In particular, agreement seems likely to be reached on the use of a single ballot paper, provided the costs of training and voter education are covered. Donors have indicated their readiness to meet these costs.

Human rights

8. During the reporting period, the MINURCA human rights section focused mainly on the organization of a national seminar on the impact of human rights in the reconstruction process. The section also continued the implementation of its ongoing projects in the field of human rights education and technical assistance, particularly the mass awareness campaign on Radio MINURCA and the training programme for the national police, with the aim of disseminating human rights concepts and principles. The section continued with its twice-weekly broadcast of human rights information and education programmes in French and Sango on Radio MINURCA.

9. The human rights section has also developed plans for a national seminar on the impact of human rights in the national reconstruction process, now scheduled for 31 May to 2 June 1999, at Bangui. This project was prepared within the framework of the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995-2004), with a view to adopting a national plan of action for human rights education and promotion. All partners and participants have agreed on several human rights themes, including development, elections, the administration of justice, law enforcement officials and security forces, women, children, refugees, media and trade unions. This diversity of themes will help in identifying needs and setting priorities in principal areas of human rights promotion and protection in the Central African Republic. The section is also preparing another training programme for newly recruited police officers, scheduled in the coming months.

Information

10. The Public Information Staff Office has been providing briefings to the media and general public, as well as schools, upon request during this reporting period. The topics of the briefings are: United Nations: creation and role;

peacekeeping operations; and MINURCA: its mandate in the Central African Republic.

11. Besides the organization of a weekly press conference, the public information section also issues a monthly letter, Lege Ti Siriri (Road to peace), in English, French and Sango. It also prepares a weekly press review that disseminates information on MINURCA and the United Nations as reflected in the local and international press.

12. A series of meetings between United Nations agencies and State broadcasters was initiated to improve cooperation and the flow of information between both sides. A new radio programme is planned, focusing on the armed forces of the Central African Republic; it is expected to take the form of a twice-weekly half-hour show called "Tous ensemble". Provision has been made in the Radio MINURCA schedule for regular programming devoted to the Electoral Commission and the electoral activities of MINURCA.

United Nations presence after the Mission

13. By paragraph 17 of its resolution 1230 (1999), the Security Council requested me to consider, in keeping with the statement of its President of 29 December 1998 (S/PRST/1998/38), what role the United Nations might play in the transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peace-building in the Central African Republic, and further requested me, in consultation with the Government of the Central African Republic, to submit recommendations on a possible United Nations presence in the Central African Republic after the termination of MINURCA.

14. Although the Secretariat has undertaken extensive consultations on this matter with various partners, including UNDP, it would appear premature at this time to submit detailed recommendations to the Council on a post-MINURCA presence of the United Nations. In general terms, however, and subject to the results of the presidential election and the developing situation within the Central African Republic, I might envisage the establishment of a small political office at Bangui following the withdrawal of MINURCA. The functions of this office could include:

(a) Facilitating continued dialogue and reconciliation, especially among the various political actors, with a view to ensuring national unity, particularly during the post-election phase;

(b) Supporting all efforts, including those of civil society, aimed at consolidating and strengthening the democratization process and promoting good governance and the rule of law;

(c) Helping to mobilize international political and financial support for the implementation of the economic, social and security reforms undertaken by the Government;

(d) Providing the political framework and focal point for integrating the activities of the United Nations system in the country in support of the Government's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, police

training, human rights and culture of peace programmes, and other post-conflict peace-building programmes.

15. In view of the need to continue to assist the Central African Republic in the conduct of security-related reforms, it may be necessary to attach a military adviser and a civilian police adviser to the office. Special consideration should also be given to enhanced international assistance to support the national police and gendarmerie, to enable them to derive maximum benefit from the training they have received during the mandate of MINURCA. I will revert to the Council with more detailed proposals at an appropriate time.

III. UNITED NATIONS ROLE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

Concept of operations

16. In paragraph 9 of its resolution 1230 (1999), the Security Council authorized MINURCA to play a supportive role in the conduct of the elections, in conformity with the tasks previously performed during the legislative elections of November and December 1998, recognizing the major responsibility which UNDP will have in the coordination of electoral assistance.

17. The MINURCA concept of operations for the support of the elections involves the deployment of international electoral observers in Bangui and at a total of 10 sites throughout the countryside, to observe all the stages of the electoral process. These include the electoral campaign, the distribution and operation of the polling sites, the casting of the ballots in two rounds (expected to be set three weeks apart), the retrieval and counting of ballot papers and the announcement of the results.

18. As I indicated in my last report (paras. 13-16), MINURCA has continued, pending the inauguration of the Electoral Commission, to refine and update its plans for electoral support. Many of these refinements derive from the lessons learned from the November and December elections, and are intended to rectify deficiencies in the quality of the support provided at that time. The MINURCA electoral unit is now in the process of being re-established with a staff of three, although difficulties and delays in recruitment persist.

19. The Secretariat's preparations for the elections take into account the size and administrative structure of the country and the poor state of its communications and transportation, especially outside the capital. The Central African Republic has a surface area of some 623,000 square kilometres and an estimated voting population of some 1.5 million. At least 2,500 polling stations will be in operation in the 16 prefectural regions and 69 sub-prefectural districts outside the capital, and in Bangui's eight arrondissements during the election. The presidential elections are expected to be held during the rainy season, when the difficulties, delays and risks of transporting personnel and sensitive materials across the country will be intensified.

Location and staffing of sites

20. As outlined in my last report (paras. 13-16), MINURCA would expect to establish eight permanent observation sites and two temporary sites throughout the country as bases for monitoring activities. To these sites would be deployed a small number of long-term electoral observers, starting early in June. MINURCA has established that the minimum number of long-term observers to ensure an acceptable level of observation is 30.

21. It is further planned to deploy up to 200 short-term observers for an intensive observation of the polling period, starting 14 days before the first round of voting, and the same number for the second round, if required. The date of the first round, while not yet fixed by the Electoral Commission, is expected to be early in September, in accordance with the Constitution of the Central African Republic. Of the 200 observers to be deployed, about half would be recruited locally from MINURCA, UNDP, embassies, consulates, non-governmental organizations and other international organizations in the country, the remaining 100 to be drawn from United Nations Headquarters and other United Nations offices, predominantly in Africa and Europe. At each site, there would be one civilian site coordinator, two or three long-term observers (22 in the field and 8 in Bangui), and one security officer, in addition to the military personnel.

22. The civilian observers would be deployed once the observation sites had been prepared and their security ensured by the deployment of a limited number of MINURCA and national troops and the necessary equipment. MINURCA would therefore propose to deploy at each of six of the permanent sites - Berberati, Kaga Bandoro, Bangassou, Bossangoa, Bozoum and Mobaye - 34 military personnel to provide basic security, communications, medical services, movement control, aviation and fuel services, and other logistic needs. At the remaining two permanent sites, Bouar and Bambari, which will also serve as regional logistics bases, MINURCA will deploy 41 personnel, including additional transportation-related specialists. Ten personnel will be deployed at each of the two temporary sites, for a total of 306 MINURCA military personnel at all sites. A total of 26 vehicles - three for each permanent site and one each at the temporary sites - will also be positioned.

23. The Secretariat has approached potential troop contributors to request the deployment of the additional specialists in logistics and communications envisaged in my last report. These would replace the 80 additional troops provided by France for logistical and medical support and the 16 additional communications specialists provided by Canada in support of the legislative elections in 1998. Revised calculations indicate that, to ensure the same services at an increased number of sites, 68 logistical personnel and 32 communications experts would be required, to be deployed two months before the first round and repatriated two weeks after the second round. The estimated total deployment duration would therefore be 13 weeks.

24. Also as outlined in my last report, and in accordance with paragraph 11 of resolution 1230 (1999), the number of Central African armed forces troops to be deployed in support of the election under United Nations supervision and rules of engagement will be increased to 360. Of these, 240 would be deployed to the

electoral sites, and 120 would remain in Bangui as a quick reaction capability and to guard sensitive electoral materials.

Additional military, security and logistical requirements

25. It is envisaged that the additional communications and logistics personnel would be provided by Canada and Egypt, respectively. Currently, I envisage that these personnel could be accommodated within the existing authorized force structure of MINURCA of 1,350 military personnel. However, if the security situation during the tense period preceding the elections deteriorates, I would not hesitate to recommend to the Council an increase in the current force structure to ensure the safety of United Nations personnel and of the electoral process.

26. Potential donors have also been approached concerning the provision of voluntary contributions to the support of the Central African armed forces troops assisting MINURCA. Their requirements include uniforms, boots and other personal gear, as well as airlift, medical support and rations at an estimated cost of some $600,000. It is envisaged that those troops would be deployed to the sites one month prior to the first round and remain until two weeks after the second round, for a duration in the field of nine weeks.

27. To enable it to respond adequately to any disturbances during the electoral campaign, MINURCA would also seek to enhance its equipment. Additional requirements would include armoured personnel carriers, to be divided among seven companies; one hard-skinned ambulance; an armoured vehicle equipped with a blade to clear roadblocks; night-vision devices; and other equipment.

28. Additional air assets will also be essential to the success of the monitoring operation. In addition to the two fixed-wing aircraft already at the disposal of MINURCA, the mission will require the temporary use of helicopters, including for medical and casualty evacuations. It is envisaged that all the helicopters will be deployed before the first round. There will also be a need for additional fixed-wing aircraft and related equipment, and some runway renovation work would be essential. In any event, adverse weather conditions during the electoral period and the absence of any meteorological infrastructure are expected to result in flight delays and cancellations, and will require the most stringent safety precautions.

IV. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

29. The Central African Republic and its capital, Bangui, have remained calm during the reporting period. However, as a result of the agreement reached at Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on 18 April, Chad has begun to withdraw its troops, estimated at 2,000 strong, from the northern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Part of the Chadian force crossed the Oubangi River from Zongo to Bangui, and then proceeded across the territory of the Central African Republic into Chad, starting in May, under MINURCA monitoring.

30. MINURCA anticipates that, as the Chadians withdraw, the Congolese rebels could advance as far as Zongo, which is directly across the river from Bangui.

MINURCA will watch this evolving situation closely in view of its potential implications for the security situation within the Central African Republic, and on the country's southern border.

Disarmament

31. The rate of recovery of arms by the disarmament committees supported by UNDP and MINURCA has slowed, apparently owing to the lack of funding. As at May 1999, about 62 per cent of light weapons and almost 95 per cent of heavy weapons taken from the Government during the mutinies of 1996 had been recovered. However, there are thought to be many more weapons clandestinely in private hands.

32. Pending the start of UNDP disarmament programmes once funding has been approved, the Government of the Central African Republic has made available some funds to each committee for sensitization and buy-back operations in an attempt to revive the programmes. It is hoped that the Government will intensify such assistance in the period leading up to the presidential elections.

Civilian police component

33. The results of the fifth training session for the Gendarmerie nationale, conducted by the MINURCA training team of 24 civilian police officers, are reflected in my last report (para. 28). The sixth training session, for 43 officers and commanders, began on 26 April and is still in progress. The second training session for the National Police ended on 16 April, with the graduation of 131 law enforcement officers and 41 police inspectors.

V. RESTRUCTURING AND DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

34. On 3 May, the National Assembly adopted as a group the four bills on the restructuring of the armed forces, by a partisan majority vote of 57 to 47. The opposition voted against the bills, which they had supported in the earlier drafting stages, because of their objections to the definition in the text of the Special Defence Force of the Republican Institutions.

35. The four new laws concern the establishment and organization of national defence; the establishment of the Supreme Council for National Defence; and crisis management. Their promulgation by Presidential Decree is expected in the next few days.

Restructuring

36. Pursuant to the adoption of these laws, the programme of restructuring the armed forces has focused on the training of the military personnel of the Central African armed forces. In accordance with the plan developed by the joint Government/MINURCA Committee on Restructuring Laws and Decrees, MINURCA has already embarked on a three-month programme of lectures and seminars on such matters as democracy, human rights and the role of the army under a democratic regime.

Demobilization

37. Preparatory work to facilitate the retirement of 630 of some 859 elements of the Central African armed forces who were due for retirement three or four years ago has been completed. The main stumbling block is the Government's lack of resources to pay the gratuity and pensions to which the retirees are legally entitled.

38. As noted in my last report (para. 31), demobilization is also proceeding in accordance with the UNDP-financed National Programme for the Demobilization and Reintegration of the armed forces. The main goals of the programme are to relieve tensions within the armed forces through the departure of those wishing to be integrated into civil life; to reduce the military salaries component of the defence budget; and to promote the reintegration of former officers into society in an economically productive manner.

39. This programme is facing a number of constraints, however. In addition to the need for some $3.1 million to fund the programme, certain risks are perceived in proceeding in the absence of the establishment of a national republican army, ethnically and sociologically balanced and respectful of democratic institutions. A coherent plan for army restructuring satisfactory to donors will also be required, as well as a clear commitment by the Government to meet its obligations to pay salary arrears and retirement pensions.

VI. ECONOMIC ASPECTS

40. The economic reform programme of the Central African Republic has made major progress in several areas during the first few months of 1999. Within the reporting period, the National Assembly has adopted a series of laws designed to promote economic and social reforms. Among these are the law for the privatization of PETROCA, the State-run petroleum products company; the law on the dissolution of the State Holding for Water (Société nationale des eaux); the laws dissolving the two Labour Offices (Office national de la main-d'oeuvre and Organisation nationale interprofessionelle de formation et de perfectionnement) and replacing them with the Agency for Employment (Agence centrafricaine pour la formation professionelle et l'emploi); and the law on the statute of the civil service. These laws were adopted in the context of the Government's economic and financial programme supported by an arrangement under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

41. In the light of the overall improved performance in programme implementation, external support for the Central African Republic is likely to resume in the coming months. The Executive Board of IMF is expected to consider the completion of the mid-term review in mid-June, which could permit the disbursement of a second tranche under the ESAF arrangement in mid-June. Further support from the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Union, and other bilateral donors could follow during the second half of 1999.

42. Nevertheless, the weak revenue position of the Government of the Central African Republic remains a major obstacle to the sustained progress of economic and social reforms. Further efforts are necessary to improve revenue

collection, particularly at customs posts, and there are indications that the Government has taken steps to improve the management of the customs service. The Government is currently receiving technical assistance from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, among others, in this area. Revenue shortages have continued to prevent the Government from paying public sector salaries on time. Accordingly, my Special Representative, Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji, has continued to put pressure on the authorities of the Central African Republic to stress the need to follow through on the reforms now being put in place so as to accelerate the drive for increased revenue generation.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

43. The revised budget for the operation of MINURCA for the current financial period (1998-1999) and the proposed budget for the biennium 1999-2000 amount on a full-cost basis to $65.9 million and $32.2 million, respectively. The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly has already considered the budgets during its current meetings and I expect the Assembly to take action on them shortly.

44. With regard to the estimated costs associated with the supportive role that MINURCA has been authorized to play in the conduct of the presidential elections, I shall submit my proposals to the General Assembly at a later date, when the full related requirements have been determined, the necessary personnel and logistical plans finalized and all parameters for the support of the elections established.

45. As at 15 May 1999, unpaid assessed contributions to the MINURCA special account amounted to $15.7 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $1.6 billion.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

46. The overall political situation has remained relatively calm. The National Assembly has been operating normally, the Deputies from both the Mouvance présidentielle and the opposition playing active roles in its deliberations. This has facilitated the consideration and adoption of laws on the restructuring of the Central African armed forces, and on economic reform, in accordance with the undertakings made to me by President Patassé in his letter dated 23 January 1999. In this context, I note the steps taken to privatize PETROCA and other State-run enterprises, the revision of the electoral code and the adoption by the National Assembly of the four draft laws on the restructuring of the armed forces.

47. However, the measures taken so far have not yielded enhancements in national revenues, which continue to fall below expectations. This is a clear indication that the Government must make further determined efforts to address the financial situation in the country. My Special Representative and the heads of the programmes and agencies of the United Nations system in Bangui will continue to encourage the Prime Minister to take measures to ensure a noticeable

improvement in the economy, in keeping with the programme agreed upon with IMF and the World Bank.

48. The persistent distrust among the leaders of the Mouvance présidentielle and the opposition has subjected the inauguration of the Electoral Commission to considerable delay. Intensive work has to be done to finalize and implement the planning required to ensure that the organization and conduct of the presidential elections can be completed in the short time remaining. I urge the Council to endorse the electoral support plan submitted by MINURCA, which is based on the minimum that is required, in the difficult circumstances prevailing within the Central African Republic, to ensure an acceptable level of observation of the freedom and fairness of the election process.

49. In paragraph 25 above, I stated that the additional military personnel required to assist the elections could be accommodated within the existing MINURCA force structure, but that I would not hesitate to request the Council for additional troops to restore the security of the Mission if I considered it to be at risk. I will indeed make every effort to remain within the authorized level of 1,350 military personnel, and will keep the Council fully informed of any relevant developments in this respect.

50. The withdrawal of Chadian forces from the Democratic Republic of the Congo is being closely monitored. Although the security situation in the Central African Republic has been calm, the possibility of a rebel advance as far as the Oubangi River could give rise to some volatility. I intend to keep the Security Council fully informed of any potential threats to stability and security in the Central African Republic, especially as they might affect United Nations personnel or threaten the electoral process.

51. Given the steps taken by the Government since my last report, the Security Council may wish to note the progress made so far, to encourage the Government to continue with its reforms, and to improve revenue generation. An expression of support from the Council, as well as financial assistance from bilateral donors, for the continued restructuring of the armed forces and the police and gendarmerie would also be very helpful. Further progress in the establishment of a well-trained and adequately equipped security force is essential in view of the volatility of the situation within and around the Central African Republic.

52. The urgency with which these reforms must be implemented and the need for planning and preparations for the elections cannot be overstressed. The delays experienced so far, especially in the establishment of the Electoral Commission, have seriously impaired the degree to which MINURCA can assist the process, having regard to the deadlines imposed by the Constitution of the Central African Republic and the 15 November expiration date of the Mission's mandate. The deployment plans outlined above for electoral support are essential to make the election credible. Any further delay or reduction in the level of electoral support may place at risk the entire purpose towards which MINURCA and the Government have been working since the initial deployment of the Mission.

53. Lastly, I wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative and to the Force Commander, Major General Barthélémy Ratanga (Gabon), and to all the personnel of MINURCA, for their efforts during the reporting period.

United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic: contributions as at 24 May 1999

Country	Staff observers	Support unit	Troops	Total
Burkina Faso	6		120	126
Canada	4	-	51	55[a]
Chad	6	-	118	124
Côte d'Ivoire	8	15	210	233
Egypt	8	200	120	328
Gabon	8	-	120	128[b]
Senegal	9	-	120	129
Togo	6	-	120	126
Total	55	215	979	1 249[c]

[a] Excluding national support elements (22).

[b] In addition to the Force Commander.

[c] In addition to 24 civilian police observers from Benin (2), Cameroon (1), Côte d'Ivoire (1), France (7), Mali (6), Portugal (2), Senegal (3) and Tunisia (2).

Map No. 4048 UNITED NATIONS
April 1998

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

Map No. 4060 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS
June 1999

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

UNITED
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S/1999/622
28 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 28 MAY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ERITREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

With respect to Djibouti's unfounded accusations about Eritrean involvement in Somalia (S/1999/600), which echo that of Ethiopia, the Government of the State of Eritrea believes that the statement of Foreign Minister Haile Weldensae of 26 May 1999 circulated as Security Council document S/1999/611 is an adequate and appropriate response.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Haile MENKERIOS
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1999/623
28 May 1999

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 MAY 1999 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the request of my Government, I have the honour to forward to you herewith a Peace Agreement on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, signed at Sirte, Libya.

I should be grateful if you will bring the contents of this letter and the annex of the above-mentioned Agreement to the attention of the members of the Security Council and have it circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Prof. SEMAKULA KIWANUKA
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of Uganda
to the United Nations

99-15953 (E) 280599

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Annex I

The Peace Agreement

On the basis of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), of the first Cariso Summit in 1964 calling for respect of the pre-independence terms,

In view of the military operations in the Great Lakes region leading to the destabilization of peace and security within various States,

Opening the door before foreign interventions, which hinder the aims of the continent towards development and integration,

Out of the Sirte mini-Summit on 30 September 1998 relative to the current conflict in the Great Lakes region,

Confirming the Lusaka Summit held from 13 to 16 January 1999, the preceding meetings and the achieved results aimed at finding a lasting, peaceful solution to the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Realizing the tragedies of the awful massacres as a result of the armed strife in the region,

The signatories to this Agreement have decided the following:

1. Affirm the security and integrity of the political borders of all States.

2. Immediate cessation of hostilities to pave the way for dialogue and peaceful solution.

3. Deployment of neutral African peacekeeping forces in the area where there are troops of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

4. Withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops will be timed with the arrival of the African peace forces.

5. The signatories to this Agreement condemn all acts of violence and mass murder, and affirm the need to chase the killers, punish and disarm them.

6. Encourage the Democratic Republic of the Congo to initiate a national dialogue for all parties.

7. Withdrawal of all foreign forces present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as soon as a peace agreement is reached.

8. All parties pledge to refrain from taking actions to overthrow the regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

9. Respect the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of countries.

10. Stress the continuity of the leading role of the brother leader as peace coordinator in the Great Lakes region, in creating the climate and mechanism, to liaise with President Shiloba and to accelerate the process of peace.

DONE at Sirte on 18/04/1429 (1999).

(Signed) H.E. Yoweri Kaguta MUSEVENI
President of the Republic of Uganda

(Signed) H.E. Idriss DEBY
President of the Republi of Chad

(Signed) H.E. Issaias AFEWORKI
President of the State of Eritrea

(Signed) H.E. Laurant Désiré KABILA
President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

(Signed) Col. Muamar EL-GADDAFI
Leader of the Great El-Fateh Revolution and Coordinator of the Peace Process in the Great Lakes

Annex II

Peace Agreement on the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed at Sirte, Libya

1. H.E. Col. Muamar Qathafi of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya convened a Summit in Sirte from 17 to 18 April 1999 which was attended by H.E. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda, H.E. Idriss Deby of Chad, H.E. President Issaias Afeworki of Eritrea and H.E. President Laurant Désiré Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

2. The Summit meeting was called to try to bring the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to an end. It was also as a result of H.E. Col. Qathafi's expressed desire to solve problems in Africa before an Extraordinary Summit of the OAU he plans to host in September 1999.

3. At the end of their deliberations, the Presidents reached a Peace Agreement on the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A copy of the Agreement is herewith faxed.

4. The major components of the Sirte Agreement are not new. They have already been agreed on within the framework of the Lusaka Regional Peace Initiative. The only new thing is that President Kabila has agreed to these positions. For President Kabila to sign the Agreement is a significant development from his past position.

5. The Sirte Peace Agreement is linked to the Lusaka Peace Process. The linkage signifies the fact that the Sirte Agreement is a declaration of commitment to the ongoing regional peace process under the facilitation of H.E. President Chiluba of Zambia. Indeed, a ceasefire agreement will have to be negotiated and finalized by all the belligerents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to enable the cessation of hostilities, the putting in place of an interposition force, the enhancement of internal dialogue and the orderly withdrawal of all foreign troops.

6. Having been in the forefront of the demand for a diplomatic solution to the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda views the Libyan initiative as positive. It compliments and facilitates the ongoing regional efforts aimed at the peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That is why it should be welcomed and supported, as it has the potential of enabling the parties make the much-desired progress. In this respect, it is urgent for H.E. Col. Qathafi to link up with H.E. President Chiluba.